Introduction

After the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the leadership of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan had to adjust to a radically new regional situation. The British had ended their mandate over Palestine, and the Zionists in Palestine had declared the State of Israel independent. During the war, the Zionists expelled many of the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs who became refugees, while others fled their homes in the ensuing uncertainty. The majority of these Palestinians sought refuge within the expanded borders of Jordan. These borders now included Jerusalem and all of the territory of Palestine that did not become part of the State of Israel or fall under Egyptian control, as well as the small area of Himma, which came under Syrian control.[1] Jordan's capture and official annexation of central Palestine, or the West Bank, in 1950 placed the kingdom in control of some of the holiest sites of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, particularly those located in the Old City in the eastern part of Jerusalem. The change in Jordan's territorial composition forced a change in the ideological construction of the nation and with it a change in the ways in which the kingdom's leaders sought to legitimize their rule.

This book considers the meeting place of religion and nationalism by exploring how the modern Jordanian state has invested sacred sites with national meaning. Early twentieth-century studies on the "sacred" focused on a functional analysis of holy places, their being the joining point between heaven and earth. Recent studies suggest that just as nations and religious groups are imagined communities, holy places are also imagined spaces, constructed to fit particular social, economic, historical, and national contexts.[2] The meaning imbued in sacred places is reflected by the ways people construct the space around them according to their specific circumstances: social, geographical, or political.[3] Like many nation-states, Jordan's leaders sought to define national identity and create national culture by reconfiguring the diverse realms of history, culture, politics, education, and diplomacy, as well as addressing issues within and among the religious communities in the kingdom. Holy places filled an important role in this process.

This is not to suggest that the holy places in Jerusalem and the West Bank are devoid of historical and religious meanings in the modern nation-state. It does suggest, however, that their meaning, as sites holy to the three monotheistic religions, must be examined within more complex relationships. While holy places are still the destination of religious pilgrims in the modern period, these sites have been infused with meanings beyond their intended religious ones. Tourist visits to holy sites, for example, have increasingly challenged the more traditional pilgrimage visits during the past half-century.[4] The increased level of state involvement in the management of such sites during the twentieth century has blurred the distinction between tourism and pilgrimage, with both tourists and pilgrims subject to the same state policies with regard to practices allowed at holy sites, including the dress code by which all visitors must abide. Purchasing tickets to enter holy places ensures that visitors to the sites, whether for purely religious reasons, pleasure, or both, contribute to the state's efforts to promote, protect, and nationalize the sites. Holy places, as tourist destinations, serve as part of the nation-state's treasures, reconceptualized to represent the nation regardless of the nation's historical age. These sites are subject to constant contestation and conflicting political agendas; thus, when the geographical and historical circumstances surrounding the sites change, so too does their religious-cum-national meaning.

Following the de-colonization of the region and the division of Palestine between Israel and Jordan in 1948, the majority of Palestinians found themselves under either Jordanian or Israeli rule.[5] While the Israeli state viewed Palestinians as an internal threat and placed them under military curfew from the war's end until 1966, the Jordanian state intended to create a Jordanian national identity for all Jordanian citizens, including those of Palestinian origin who were now demographically the majority in the kingdom. The Jordanian-controlled part of Jerusalem—an important site for Palestinians, Muslims, and Christians—became a focal point for the construction of Jordan's identity during this period.[6]

The consolidation of Hashemite rule over the expanded kingdom, which now included both banks of the Jordan River, became, in 1950, the primary concern of Jordanian officials engaged in image-management and legitimization practices, particularly with regard to the holy places found in the newly acquired territory. While Jordan's king continued to proclaim support for the Palestinians and their rights in Palestine, Jordanian support for Palestine's Arabs soon yielded to more pressing national concerns based on Jordan's geographical reality after the 1948 war. Continued support for

Palestine's Arabs now ran contrary to the new goals of promoting national unity and legitimizing Hashemite rule over central Palestine and Jerusalem. With Jordan now home to more than 750,000 Arabs from Palestine, state officials wished to absorb this population into the developing Jordanian nation-state.

The division of Jerusalem in 1948, the result of an "unholy alliance" between Jordan and Israel, successfully eliminated the Palestinians from any official political participation in the city; nevertheless, they had an important role to play there.[7] Some scholars have argued that Palestinian nationalism lay dormant during this period, as Palestinians faced dislocation and political uncertainty under both regimes. Yet during this period, some Palestinians in Jerusalem openly opposed Jordanian rule in the city, as they did in other West Bank cities. In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was created in Jerusalem, nominally under the sponsorship of Jordan's King Hussein, with the goal of liberating Palestine. The extent to which Palestinian opposition to Jordanian rule in Jerusalem led to the formation of the PLO in the Holy City is but one of a number of complex questions that arise from the study of Jerusalem between 1948 and 1967. Clearly, a complicated constellation of forces was at work in the region, and change in one state's history did not occur in isolation from broader regional and political events. By employing a relational approach, this book offers a broad regional overview of this period that considers the histories of states and non-state bodies in relation to, rather than isolated from, one another.[8] This framework will allow for careful consideration of the place of the Palestinians in Jordanian Jerusalem, and the place of Jerusalem in Palestinian national discourse, in addition to examining the role of sacred places in Jordanian national discourse.

Between 1948 and 1967, official Jordanian institutions reproduced images of holy places in Jerusalem and the West Bank as symbols that at once depicted the nation and legitimized the state.[9] These images appeared on items such as banknotes, postage stamps, medallions, and tourism brochures, and in school textbooks, many of which are engaged here as historical "texts" and are often referred to as cultural artifacts or markers. Official links between the Hashemite Kingdom and Muslim, Christian, and Jewish holy sites or artifacts appear infrequently in the historical record. To gain a more complete picture of the cultural history of Jordan in the modern period and a deeper understanding of the role of a holy city in a modern nation-state, one must analyze these kinds of cultural artifacts for the alternative or previously unconsidered meanings they may provide.

Based primarily on official sources, this study presents an elite vision of the construction of national identity in Jordanian society from 1948 to 1967, particularly with regard to holy places. A number of factors—a transplanted monarchy in Jordan, the creation of the state by British imperial politics, and a majority Palestinian population ruled by a minority (Hashemite) government—created the need for legitimation practices in the kingdom. Discourses of legitimacy and authority are gleaned from the symbolic imagery that appears on cultural markers: state-issued, functional paraphernalia that bear symbolic imagery intended to support the national project. By examining both state-issued cultural artifacts depicting Jerusalem's holy places and the cultural politics of religion and nationalism, this book addresses the role of holy places in the arrangements and practices employed to secure political and social legitimacy in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

There is, however, a risk involved in discussing visual imagery and its impact on national identity formation in Jordan. Historical records rarely exist or are not accessible to support the suppositions made from an analysis of the images. Analysis thus relies heavily on positioning these images within an appropriate historical context, drawn from existing scholarship, and on examining contemporary accounts, where available, to establish a basis for exploring the construction of national identity in a region for which some have said no identity exists.[10] Others have claimed that it is based solely on the king, the bedouin and their role in the military, the Palestine "question," British visions for Transjordan, or on a tribal identity, among other factors.[11] While recognizing the contribution of existing scholarship on Jordan, this book moves in a different direction. Rather than remain fast to the vision of identity constructed around the geographical and demographic realities of Jordan, this study addresses shifts in both of those factors, focusing on the addition to the kingdom's religious and material culture that accompanied it.

Visual and written sources from the period examined provide evidence of the Jordanian government's efforts to construct a national identity with Jerusalem as a focal point. While deftly delineating the nation's identity visually through holy places, the Jordanian state also exercised its power of authority over Jerusalem through state legislation and political appointments, the imposition of taxes, and the creation of official bodies charged with renovating holy places. Additionally, the monarchy and the Jordanian government became entangled in sectarian disputes within the kingdom's Christian communities. During the mid-1950s, years of political instability in Jordan, the kingdom's leadership sought support for its rule by supporting one or another faction within the Greek Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox communities during patriarchal succession struggles.

This history relies on sources in Arabic (speeches by the king, newspaper accounts, government documents) as well as European languages (consular and Foreign Office reports, foreign newspapers) to highlight the modern social role of holy places in Jordan. Intently concerned with events and actions in Jerusalem, French and primarily British consular reports discussed Jordan's legislative measures, architectural efforts, and religious involvement in Jerusalem. Britain's day of domination in the Middle East and in Jordan was passing during the 1950s, and British consular and Foreign Office officials realized that they had less power than did British officials under the mandate. This realization forced them to deal with Jordan as a sovereign state, despite the fact that Jordan was still militarily and financially dependent on Britain for almost ten years after independence. The foreign records examined in this study are considered in light of these political and historical circumstances.

The weak state of the archives in the kingdom may be due to the fact that Jordan is a poor country with few resources for nonessentials such as archives. With regard to the print media, as this was not intended to be a study based primarily on newspapers (and at highest count there were nine or ten newspapers published in the kingdom during this period), the research focused on dates tied to events on either the religious calendar (e.g., Christmas or *laylat al-isra᾽ wa-al-mi῾raj* [Night Journey and Ascension of the prophet Muhammad]), the national calendar (e.g., Jordan's participation in the New York World's Fair), or other major historical events that occurred which had something to do with Jerusalem and likely would have elicited newspaper coverage in Jordan (e.g., the convening of the first meeting of the PLO in 1964, opened by King Hussein). A number of sources were indeed difficult, if not impossible, to gain access to in Jordan, particularly when dealing with a subject like Jerusalem that is perceived to be sensitive. For example, in the realm of education, meetings with at least three high officials in the Jordanian Ministry of Education, all of whom stated that there is no Education Ministry archive, turned up only fragmentary archival information. This forced reliance on published laws, of which there were few, and an incomplete collection of the Ministry's annual reports during the nineteen years under review, to discuss changes in education. A brief discussion of education appears in chapter 4 insofar as the position of Jerusalem affected changes in education, as a way to introduce the topic and recognize its importance, but not to overdo it for lack of primary source material. Additionally, I reviewed history and geography textbooks from the period; I did not do so systematically, however, because while a Museum for School Books existed in Salt, Jordan, during the period of research, a complete collection of the textbooks for every grade and every subject does not. One would be hard-pressed to produce even a complete list of books in use between 1948 and 1967. What existed was a collection of books from donors who still had their books many years after they had finished school and thought well of the royal project to house them in a museum, and so contributed their textbooks.[12] What I learned from my reading of that limited number of textbooks was not enough to offer a complete analysis of education policy with regard to the role of Jerusalem in the kingdom. Access to records from the Jordanian Royal Court and the Foreign Ministry was not forthcoming, despite persistent efforts to gain entry. Officials often claimed that the state had not preserved documentary evidence of its past. In other efforts to locate primary source material for this project, visits to the Jordan Radio and Television Corporation (although television came to Jordan only in 1967) produced only the king's speeches, which are also published. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Awqaf (pious endowments) only came into existence in 1967, the end of the period addressed here, and thus had little to contribute to this project. Within the context of these limitations, historical work on the modern Jordanian state is dependent on royal speeches, legislation, newspapers, foreign archives, and, most important for this study and for a deeper understanding of Jordan's modern history, visual sources—all of which appear throughout this study. Examining the role of Jerusalem in Jordan's history, this book is the start on which I hope future scholars will base their work when exploring Jordanian Jerusalem and when looking at the relationship of holy places to identity formation.

Oral sources do not necessarily corroborate written sources, as the nature of memory and its role in writing history raise concerns beyond the scope of this work. That is not to say that historical documents offer the empirical truth and that oral testimony does not. A number of people, both of Palestinian and Transjordanian origin, are still alive, and their memory of the 1948–67 period offers yet another approach to understanding Jordan's history in Jerusalem. This kind of "living history" is, indeed, important to writing about the history of any given region, although in this book it serves as but one element in, rather than the foundation of, the study.[13] In fact, people who are old enough to remember the period of Jordan's rule in Jerusalem, interviewed during the course of research for this project, both in Jordan and in Jerusalem, offered a personal historical perspective to complement or counter the official historical perspective that documentary sources offer. In some cases they also confirmed or denied the historical context drawn from secondary sources. The interviewees—whether of Transjordanian, Palestinian, Muslim, Christian, or other ethnic or religious backgrounds—shared stories about their lives during the period, as the Jordanian government and monarchy sought to legitimize its rule over the Holy City and to construct an identity through the appropriation and careful control of symbols of holy places.

The city of Jerusalem has a distinct place in each of the monotheistic religions. All three—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—consider Jerusalem holy, a meeting place for God and man, although the specific stories about the city differ. Jews, for example, recall the site, known in Hebrew as *har ha-bayit* (Temple Mount), not only for its reference to the "Binding of Isaac" story in the Hebrew Bible, which recounts Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his only son to God, but also for its being the location of the Jewish temples of antiquity. They still revere the site as the "holy of holies," although the exact location of the temples is now unknown. The holiness of the city and its environs in Christian tradition stems from its association with the life of Jesus, particularly as the place where he is believed to have died and then risen from the dead, an event known to later Christians as the Resurrection. Muslims revere the city, most notably, as the site of Muhammad's Night Journey (*al-israʾ*) to Jerusalem and then ascent to heaven (*al-miʿraj*), events recounted in Qur'an 17:1 and retold in various *hadith* (sayings of the prophet Muhammad).[14] Jerusalem is Islam's third holiest city after Mecca and Medina, and was the first *qibla* (direction of prayer) for the early Muslims. Traditions and prophets from Judaism and Christianity are broadly accepted in Islam; thus Jewish and Christian associations with Jerusalem also resonate strongly in Islam's connection to the Holy City. This brief outline of the significance of Jerusalem in the monotheistic religions does not begin to convey the fact that within and among these three religions there is great controversy and disagreement about both the specific location of the sites claimed as holy and the historical and religious veracity of the claims.

National control of the Holy City has been and continues to be complex, as it raises the issue of how nation-states—for the most part secular and governed by human-made laws—can justifiably rule, and appropriate symbolically, what has long been associated with the Divine. Before the Hashemite Jordanian state in the twentieth century, the Ottoman state, during the early modern and modern periods, expressed state control over the

Holy City in a way that both bolstered the holiness of the city and appropriated it for state purposes.[15] Like Jordan before it in the eastern part of Jerusalem, Israel also sought to make the Holy City a central part of its national representation and discourse. After 1967, the Jewish State demolished the houses at the Abu Midyan Muslim *waqf* property (pious endowment)—home to several hundred Palestinian Muslims who were evicted in the process—located in front of the Western Wall, which is revered by Jews, to enlarge the Wall's capacity for Jewish worshippers and tourists, as well as to provide a "holy space" for national military ceremonies.[16] In the twentieth century the distinction between holy places and national spaces blurred, as state governments adopted the Holy City and its sacred sites to legitimize national rule and create a national identity.

"Protector of the Holy Places" in the Ottoman Period

The intersection of state-produced images, national symbols, and legitimation practices in Jerusalem can be traced in small part to the Ottoman period. While Jerusalem is not the focus of the study, Selim Deringil's *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909* develops the theme of image management in the Ottoman Empire at the end of the nineteenth century. Deringil examines the empire's "self-portrait," constructed by the Ottoman sultan, ʿAbd al-Hamid II (1876–1909), to "escape the designation 'exotic,'" an image Europeans had created through nineteenth-century photographs and literary works. The "exotic" designation diminished the sultan's perceived legitimacy and authority in international politics. To counteract this image, he sent albums to the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., in 1893 and the British Museum in 1894, filled with photographs designed to provide visual evidence of the new Ottoman "self-portrait." These albums, which the sultan hoped would legitimize his empire among the strong powers of the nineteenth century, proffered images of modern military installations and educational institutions, in addition to landscapes, monuments, and antiquities.[17]

The Ottoman sultan promoted the sanctity of Jerusalem within the empire through cultural as well as political means.[18] The Hashemites followed a similar pattern when they reconfigured the meaning of holy places as national symbols within the boundaries of the Jordanian state.[19] Jordan's founder, King Abdullah, grew up in the political and social milieu of the late Ottoman period, in Istanbul from 1893 to 1908. Thus it is no surprise that there are similarities between Ottoman practices of social and political legitimation and later Hashemite efforts. Both restricted land purchases near holy places, thereby emphasizing and legitimating their role as protector of the holy places.[20] With Jerusalem within the Ottoman domain, the sultan claimed the role of "protector of Jerusalem" (hami bayt al-maqdis).[21] Not only did the sultan proclaim his distinction as ruler and guardian of the holy places and the Holy City, but local Jerusalemites also addressed the sultan by this title, which added to the legitimacy of the person and office of the sultan. The next time the title of "protector" of Jerusalem/the holy places would emerge at the state level would be when the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan took control of Jerusalem in 1948.[22] Even an important Muslim figure such as al-Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the Palestinian leader during the British mandate period, did not bear this title. His title was grand mufti and president of the Supreme Muslim Council, a British-created body managing Islamic affairs in mandatory Palestine.[23]

As the Hashemites would, the Ottomans used pictorial representations to assert their dominance over Jerusalem and its holy places. Ottoman manuscripts from as early as the mid-sixteenth century, and appearing regularly until the late nineteenth century, were illustrated with images of Jerusalem's holy sites.[24] Drawn on pilgrimage certificates, guidebooks, and geographical treatises, these images denote the special place of Jerusalem for Ottoman rulers.[25] To augment the imperial message, the images were often accompanied by Qur'anic phrases, in particular Sura 17:1, which speaks of the *al-israʾ wa-al-miʿraj*, the Night Journey of the Prophet from Mecca to Jerusalem and then to heaven, thereby helping to establish the religious legitimization of Ottoman rule over Islam's third holiest city.

Like the Ottoman pavilion for the 1904 World's Fair, with its model of the Dome of the Rock, the Hashemites would use the same monument as a major symbol of legitimacy in the 1964 World's Fair.[26] As a result of the great expense, and gross Ottoman debt to Europe, Sultan ʿAbd al-Hamid II needed some convincing to participate in the St. Louis World's Fair in 1904. Alexander Konta, a St. Louis banker/entrepreneur, pressured the sultan for his cooperation to erect an Ottoman exhibit so that Konta might profit from Ottoman (read exotic) representations in this international arena. To do this, Konta exploited the sultan's "obsession with his claim" to be the "sole Defender of the Faith and Protector of the Holy Places," as he planned to build the Ottoman exhibit around Jerusalem's holy places.[27] Konta reminded the sultan that he was the caliph of all Muslims, successor to the Prophet, and, as such, must agree to represent Islam, in this case by prominently displaying "an exact replica of the Mosque of the Caliph Omar."[28] "World's fairs were idealized platforms where cultures could be encapsulated visually—[most] prominently, through architecture, [which] became closely intertwined with redefinitions of local cultures."[29] By sponsoring this exhibit, the Ottoman sultan-caliph would be able to link himself with ʿUmar, Islam's second caliph but the first to enter Jerusalem in conquest. The position of caliph had waned during the Ottoman centuries, but Sultan ʿAbd al-Hamid II had indeed tried to increase its value in the empire. In sponsoring the exhibit, the sultan-caliph could reclaim his sovereignty over Jerusalem, at a time when the Ottomans had lost and would continue losing vast tracts of land in the empire.[30] Sponsorship of the pavilion, with the Dome of the Rock as a centerpiece, could validate the right of the Ottoman sultan, a Muslim of non-Arab, Turkish descent, to rule Islam's holy places. Indeed, as the Hashemites would do in Jerusalem throughout the twentieth century, Ottoman sultans spent great sums of money renovating and decorating the Muslim holy places in all three of Islam's holy cities, which were located in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.[31]

During the nineteenth century, increased international involvement in Jerusalem challenged the Ottoman effort to preserve the status of the Jerusalem region in the empire. Emboldened with a new passion for authenticating the biblical narrative, European explorers, archaeologists, and geographers came to Jerusalem and Palestine to investigate and preserve the biblical past.[32] These Europeans became involved in the affairs of the local Christian communities in Palestine, including controversies over various holy places. Disputes between competing Christian groups, backed by European powers, forced the Ottoman authorities to step in and solve the matter of competing claims to, and rights in, the holy places, despite their longstanding policy of leaving the empire's religious minorities to manage their own affairs. Parts of shrines were parceled out to the antagonistic Christian sects, each sponsored by a European imperial power, as claims to "possession of the physical remains of Biblical antiquity became an issue of national prestige and sectarian honor."[33] Nevertheless, by the end of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman sultan's position regarding the holy places in Jerusalem was still distinct. The combination of local changes and international involvement in Jerusalem led the Ottomans to elevate the status of Jerusalem in the empire to that of an independent sanjak (district).[34]

Transjordan during the Ottoman Period

The area that became Transjordan in 1921 had no distinct political status in the Ottoman Empire. Communal identity broke down along more localized groups: tribes, clans, and families. Although there were several districts within the area, namely, ʿAjlun, Balqaʾ, Karak, and Maʿan, each separately administered, they were economically connected to different regions during different periods.[35] By the end of the nineteenth century, ʿAjlun was part of southern Syria, Balqaʾ was connected to north central Palestine, and both Karak and Maʿan were linked to the northern part of the Hijaz.[36] The status of these districts sometimes changed on paper, by administrative decree, before the Ottomans actually secured control over the area.[37] There were few natural or other resources in the region, which was significant chiefly as an area through which pilgrims passed on their way to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina for the Hajj, the annual Muslim pilgrimage. The Ottomans stationed garrisons and built up a network of fortresses along the Hajj route, in addition to engaging in agreements with and paying off bedouin tribes, to protect the pilgrims during their journey. The Ottomans eventually built the Hijaz Railroad (1900–1908) both to transport pilgrims and to extend their control over the holy places of Mecca and Medina.[38]

There was little direct Ottoman political involvement in Transjordan, as the region was primarily a border zone between the more settled regions to the west and the desert to the east.[39] In their effort to reestablish control over this area toward the end of the nineteenth century, the Ottomans relocated to Transjordan non-Arab Muslims who would be loyal to the rulers. They established garrisons, settled some of the tribes through land grants, and imposed taxation and conscription in the region. Beginning in the 1860s, the Ottoman authorities reorganized the districts in Syria, including Transjordan, and increased their administrative control over the region by introducing new local administrative, financial, judicial, and security institutions.[40] These changes affected the inhabitants of Transjordan differently, depending on the dynamics between the Ottoman administrators and the local population in each district or subdistrict. In Salt, for example, merchant activity had increased by the 1880s as a result of the imposition of administrative institutions.[41] Conversely, the greater Ottoman presence sparked revolts in towns such as Shawbak (1905) and Karak (1910), a result of a clash of interests between the villagers and townspeople on the one hand and the Ottoman officials on the other. The central Ottoman government imposed on the redesignated districts of the region institutions that were represented by a financial officer, a director of land registration, a registrar of births, as well as officials of the departments of agriculture and trade, education, and posts and telegraphs. This administrative structure eventually provided the foundation for the formation of the Transjordanian state under British colonial control.[42]

The area of Transjordan witnessed continuous migration, particularly between the east and west banks of the Jordan River. The Ottoman rulers tried actively to settle some parts of this area, and in the late nineteenth century non-Arab Muslim families, namely, Circassians and Chechens from the Caucasus region in Central Asia and Turkmen from Turkmenia, were resettled in the area of Amman, as they sought refuge from persecution in their native land.[43] These groups combined with the local population, which at the end of the nineteenth century was largely nomadic, to form Transjordan's population when the borders were demarcated after World War I. The twentieth century would bring the birth and growth of cities, especially the capital, and the growth of trade, as a large merchant community arrived from Syria in the 1930s and 1940s and flourished during World War II.[44] Transjordan also faced massive migration in 1948 with the influx of a large Arab population from Palestine as a result of the war.

Leading up to and including the Ottoman period, the area that is now the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan never had a separate sense of identity. Transjordan never had a movement of the people—whether intellectuals, petit bourgeois, or proletariat—that sought any kind of independent political entity.[45] Transjordan's emergence as a nation-state began modestly, from "above," designed and carved out by the British following the events of World War I. While Transjordan's rulers worked to construct a particular identity within the 1921–46 historical and geographical framework, the fact of the 1948 war in Palestine led to broad changes in the Kingdom of Jordan, independent as of 1946.[46] The wholesale adoption of the holy places that fell within Jordan's newly created borders after the war led to stark changes in the kingdom's identity-building project and in the ways in which the kingdom established political and religious legitimacy.

Following this introduction, chapter 1 sketches the political-historical background of the Hashemites, their role in the creation of the Jordanian state, and their involvement in the Holy City. The Hashemite family had long maintained a unique position in the Hijaz, particularly in Mecca. This family, which traces its lineage, or its pedigree, to the prophet Muhammad, held control of the holy sites in the Hijaz, giving the family a special status among Muslims.[47] Gaining control of Jerusalem after having lost Islam's first two holy sites appeared to be compensation for the Hashemites of Jordan; they sought to prove their legitimacy to rule over Jerusalem, in part through their familial association with the Prophet, and through their former position in Mecca. Chapter 1 thus begins with Sharif Husayn, the twentieth-century founder of the dynasty, although never ruler of Jordan, and ends with Abdullah ibn al-Husayn, who ruled first as emir of Transjordan and then as king of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (King Abdullah I), until his assassination in 1951. The chapter includes an overview of British mandatory Palestine and the Hashemite leaders' relationship to the mandate (to which Transjordan became attached a few months after the mandate's inception), to the British, and to the Palestinian Arabs. Further, it examines some of the newly created institutions that played a role in the evolution of the Transjordanian state and its early use of symbols, which appeared on postage and revenue stamps, to construct identity during the three decades prior to the kingdom's independence.

Chapter 2 continues the presentation of historical background, addressing the period leading up to Jordan and Israel's division of Jerusalem in 1948, with a discussion of nation-building during that particular historical period. The chapter first considers the United Nations plan for the partition of Palestine, which included a clause for Jerusalem's rule under an international trustee, and is followed by a discussion of Jordan's role in the 1948 war, particularly during the battle for Jerusalem. Jordan's success in the battle—preventing Israel from taking the eastern part of the city with its holy places in the Old City—quickly became a mantra by which the country's leaders could authenticate their rule over Jerusalem, yet Palestinian opposition to Jordan's position complicated matters. After this historical background, the chapter then considers the official unification (1950) of the east and west banks, and how it came to impact policymaking in the Hashemite Kingdom. The chapter highlights the visual sources—stamps and banknotes—that identify the changing Jordanian position toward Jerusalem after the war, and its place in the kingdom leading up to King Abdullah I's assassination in Jerusalem in 1951 and the beginning of King Hussein's reign.

Chapters 3 and 4 address the Jordanian government's efforts to legitimize its sovereignty over Jerusalem by examining situations and projects that tested Jordan's political ability to develop policies, to create and implement legislation with regard to Jerusalem's holy places and religious institutions, and to withstand international criticism of these actions. Chapter 4 also demonstrates how the Hashemites strengthened Jordan's political relationship to the holy places of Jerusalem following independence through architectural investment, coupled with the pre-state family contribution to the renovations of the Dome of the Rock that was adopted into Jordan's developing national discourse. Throughout the centuries, the passing of control in Jerusalem, whether by military or political means, has always been marked by architectural change, usually renovations of holy places with rulers seeking to legitimate their rule, as Thomas Franck has argued, "through the symbolism of public works."[48] The issues discussed in these two chapters demonstrate how Jerusalem and its holy places played a part in Jordan's identity-building project, in addition to identifying how the expression of sovereignty over such a holy site was, and is, contested by religious groups and political powers.

During the 1948–67 period, as argued in chapter 5, the Jordanian government reconfigured the cultural politics of tourism and national/cultural events as a means to assert Jordan's political legitimacy in and authority over Jerusalem and its holy places. The Tourism Authority implemented policies in part to convey the Jordanian government's vision of national identity to all its citizens, as well as to stimulate the national economy. Jordan's self-proclaimed role as "protector of the holy places" and self-definition as the "Holy Land" were two important slogans that described Jordan's national message in official discourse and appeared often in tourism publications. At international events, Jordan's officials chose exhibition items that were primarily reproductions of holy places to represent Jordan's national identity abroad. The Jordanian government did not limit cultural production of Jerusalem's significance in the kingdom merely to the field of tourism, although it was the most prominent field in which expression of Jerusalem's national value was disseminated.

Although addressed throughout the book, the Palestinians and their national interests in Jerusalem are the subject of chapter 6. It begins by examining the role of the Jordanian state and King Hussein in the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which took place in Jordanian-controlled Jerusalem in 1964. Yet again, Palestinian opposition to Jordan emerged and Hussein had to skillfully maneuver his way through the inter-Arab political arena to ensure his kingdom's stability in the face of the soon-to-be-created PLO, while promoting Jordan's support for the Palestine cause.

The loss of Jerusalem ushered in a new period in Jordan's history and brought with it an emphasis on new symbols for the changing national identity, an issue addressed in chapter 7. The place of the Holy City in Jordanian political and national discourse lagged a bit in the decades after the city fell under Israeli occupation in 1967. East Bank historical sites and the image of tribes and bedouin replaced holy places in Jordan's national collective consciousness, beginning in the 1970s. During the 1990s and leading into the twenty-first century, new developments in archaeology, and with it conceptions of history, brought Jordan's leaders back to the "Holy Land" theme, as they again constructed identity around newly excavated holy places. Nevertheless, the role of Jerusalem in Jordan's national discourse did not disappear after 1967, although its promotion varied following the loss of the Holy City to Israel. For the Palestinians, as their national movement gained in organization and in world presence in the decades since Israel captured Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan, so too did their claims for a political and national role in the Holy City, that part of the city that had been omitted from the PLO platform at the organization's inception in 1964. For much of the decades that followed the 1967 war, Jordanian and Palestinian interests in Jerusalem became part of a mutual competition for political and national control over and legitimacy in the Holy City.